

# Science, Consciousness, Perception, Praxis

*Published by N+1 #33 in April 2013*

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For some time we had been planning a work to attempt to answer recurring questions such as: where did the Communist International go wrong in plunging into opportunism to the point of becoming a force for counter-revolution? Or: where did the 'Italian' Communist Left go wrong to be annihilated by its opponents to the point of being erased from history?

Poorly posed questions, which one deludes oneself into thinking it is easy to answer on the basis of the documentation of the time and subsequent reconstructions, but which in reality pose no small problems, starting with the use of the concept of 'error'. It was certainly a mistake, for example, to attend a Frontist conference with the Two and a Half International, represented by Adler, Bernstein and Kautsky, who were figures on whom the thunderbolts of the same Lenin who now advocated rapprochement had fallen, only to then become furious with Radek & C. for having conceded too much. But can Lenin's, and then Radek's, really be called a mistake? Lenin was no slouch, he must have known very well that by snacking with the devil one gets a little burnt. So why the 'caveats'? Even Bordiga, in the report we published in the last issue, says: dear Vladimir, you know very well that if you tell the workers that a united front must be made they will believe you and obey; but a united front with traitors can only give Radek results.

The political events of a revolution are subject to the same laws that govern all other fields, it is hard to see why they should be exempt. Determinations weighing on individuals and groups (or parties) lead to results that history records. We are equipped to analyse processes in every field, yet we sometimes fail in the field that interests us most, that of the dynamics and forms that characterise a revolution, its path and its outcome.

In the first two articles of this journal, we formulate an approach that collective work will be responsible for developing or archiving. We certainly do not seek psychological explanations, or the fault of individuals. We have started from the simple elements of which we are biologically made, obeying an imperative of our current regarding the theory of knowledge. We took our cue from a booklet by the mathematician Jacob Bronowski (see bibliography), leaving the first results to decant; and, continuing with the use of a short essay by the physicist Enrico Bellone on the same topics (id.), we made it the subject of a report at one of our editorial meetings, reviewed the two texts (in issue no. 30) and drafted the two articles mentioned above. The reader will also find in this issue a review of a substantial volume by Julian Jaynes on the origin of consciousness.

Bellone, who died shortly after the book was published, was a convinced Galilean. He had published many essays based on the extension of the great Pisan's principles according to invariants in the light of today's knowledge. His operating principle in this field was that of Stephen Hawkins: '*Philosophy is dead, having failed to keep pace with the latest developments in science*'. The method he uses in the above-mentioned essay is to remove physically explainable phenomena from the speculation of idealistic philosophies: a scientific theory of knowledge tells us that we are the product of an evolution that has lasted millions of years. There is therefore no special 'I' but a whole. A profound awareness of this fact can change the practice of a community.